Then he added that, of course, ontology and/or ethics can be the primary focus of such courses, and so the epistemological orientation isn't at all a necessity.
This is surely a generalization; I mean by this to say, though, that it is generally true. To be sure, the introductory survey philosophy courses taught at U.Va., in my opinion, spend good deal of time looking at ethics and metaphysics (here used synonymously with ontology) as well as epistemology. But it is true that many of these courses do revolve around epistemology. Why might this be? Two factors occurred to me as possible causes of this orientation.
The first is the basic importance placed on Descartes' Meditations. Indeed, the first two Meditations are among the most popular readings in the first week for many philosophy courses.
Descartes is regarded, it seems to me, to have established what might be called the modern philosophical paradigm by his skeptic attitude (exemplified in the first Meditation), and his (at least allegedly) procedure. This is why he is read so widely.
But his concern in the Meditations are explicitly epistemological. His question is: What, if any, can we know about the (external) world? As for the nature of the things that are in the world, which is the subject of ontology, Descartes does not spend much time meditating. In fact, he gets the job done by retrieving the whole of the "material" external world back from his radical skepticism by summoning almighty non-deceiving God.
So the popularity of Descartes has something to do with the American philosophy education being more closely linked to epistemology than to other areas. But the second reason is more interesting, and it pertains to the customary division of contemporary philosophy into the "analytic" tradition and the "continental" tradition.
It occurred to me that these two traditions take ontology in quite distinct manners. Namely, the analytic tradition regards ontology as more closely related to epistemology, whereas the continental tradition regards ontology as more closely related to ethics.
The bifurcation must have occurred sometime before 1930. After that, the two traditions began to speak very differently about ontology. On one hand, there were thinkers in analytic tradition whose ontological concerns were primarily related to perception; on the other hand, there were thinkers in continental tradition whose ontological concerns were primarily related to human existence. The representative problems of the former school are the status of sense-datum and verificationism, and those of the latter school are the status of "Da-sein" and existentialism.
And this seems to me to be the root of the hidden "directedness" or inherent orientation that is presupposed in any "history of philosophy." Identification of this with "history of epistemology," thus, is a specifically Anglo-Saxon analytic phenomenon.
Now, what of Japanese philosophical education? I don't know. It'd be interesting to compare though.
Current music: Use Of Light, from "Deep Song" (Kurt Rosenwinkel)
日本っていうのは、つくづく思うけどやっぱり変な国で、1870年代に当時普仏戦争で勝ってイケイケだったプロイセンに範を取って近代化を進めたわけで、まあそれは哲学で言ったらヘーゲル的な学問体系の導入ということになると思うのだけど。
日本の近代化はヘーゲル的『精神(Geist)』を取り入れることにあった、と言えるかもしれない。
もちろん、本国ではヘーゲル主義は落ち目もいいとこだったのだけど、マルクスの思想が伝播していった過程を見ればわかるように、思想が他の国や地域に影響を及ぼすにはけっこうな時間がいるわけで。
で、そんな国は他にはないから、なかなか比べようがない気はする。
"bifurcation"に関して言えば、これは第一次世界大戦がかなり大きなポイントになってくるとは思う、無知を承知で言えば。
音楽にしても美術にしてもそうだけど。
とか、色々考えてたら、これはblogで1エントリー使う分量になりそうなので、この辺で失礼する 笑
うん。日本は一神教っていう西洋の前提が欠落してるからなおさら興味深い。だから、マルクス主義に関しては熱っぽく語れるのに、ニーチェとキルケゴール、そしてダーウィンの進化論なんかにはどうもピンとこないっていう事態が起きる。このあたりが日本における分析哲学／大陸哲学の分化に強い影響を持ってるのは間違いないと思う。不思議だよね、ラッセルは生理的に受けつけないくせにヴィトゲンシュタインは神格化して、中学生からフロイト、高校ではデリダを読んでいる国民って。
あとヘーゲルに関していえば「Geist」と「精神」っていう言葉が両方とも「mind」とも「spirit」とも取れるっていう両義性も一役買ってる気がする。まあ「l'esprit」もそうだけど。
Bifurcation、今読み返してみてなんで「1930年以前」って書いたのかよくわからん（笑）。でも『論考』が1921年、『存在と時間』が1927年、フロイトの『文明とその不満』が1929年だから。確かにこの三つは一次大戦がなかったらありえないからね。ヴィトゲンシュタインとフロイトに関しては明らかだけど、知っての通りハイデガーも心臓に問題があった（ほんとはなかったけど）と診断されて戦中は手紙の「検閲」の仕事に携わっていたし、きっとなにか思うところがあったはず。